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Criminal Law
by Franklin J. Hogue*
and
Laura D. Hogue"

I.

INTRODUCTION

This year we surveyed hundreds of criminal law cases to select those
we thought most worthy of inclusion in this survey. We have no doubt
that other lawyers practicing criminal law would have included other
cases and left out some we included. This is a survey of the vast everchanging landscape of criminal law, and the practitioner may use this
article as a starting point for the careful and detailed research that must
be done in actual cases.

* Partner in the firm of Hogue & Hogue, Macon, Georgia. Atlanta Christian College
(B.A., magna cum laude, 1980); Emmanuel School of Religion (M.A., in theology, summa
cum laude, 1983); Georgia State University (M.A., in philosophy, summa cum laude, 1988);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., cum laude, 1991). Member, State
Bar of Georgia; Past-President, Macon Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; sustaining
member, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; member, National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
** Partner in the firm of Hogue & Hogue, Macon, Georgia. Columbus College (B.A.,
cum laude, 1986); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., magna cum
laude, 1991). Member, State Bar of Georgia; member, Georgia Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers.
Special thanks to Robert W. Chestney and his firm, The Chestney-Hawkins Law Firm,
in Atlanta, Georgia, for contributing the DUI summaries for this year's review. The
authors do not practice in the DUI field, so we went to Bob, one of the best practitioners
in this area of law. We appreciate him for sharing his time and knowledge for the benefit
of this Article.
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PRETRIAL ISSUES

Jeopardy

In Hooker v. State,1 jeopardy attached when defendant pleaded guilty
in state court to failing to stop at the scene of an accident, DUI, and
following too closely, thereby precluding the State from prosecuting
defendant in superior court for an aggravated assault that arose out of
the same incident.2
The sheriff, in a "compassionate measure,"3
advised defendant to complete an alcohol treatment program quickly and
to plead guilty to the misdemeanor charges in state court in order to
save his driver's license. The sheriff, in a further attempt to help
defendant, requested that the secretary in the district attorney's office
send the misdemeanor paperwork to state court so that defendant could
plead guilty there. She did so without conferring with the district
4
attorney.
Defendant entered his plea in state court. Some time later, the
district attorney sought an indictment against defendant for the felony
charge. Defendant filed a plea of former jeopardy, which the superior
court granted on the misdemeanors.5 The court of appeals reversed,
observing established law that
the acceptance of a defendant's misdemeanor plea constitutes a bar to
his prosecution on felony charges arising from the same transaction
where an assistant district attorney having jurisdiction over all the
offenses had made an election, whether intentionally or by default, to
dispose of the charges separately rather than requiring all the offenses
to be bound over to superior court.'
The result would have been different had defendant, through his
attorney, attempted to manipulate the system by pleading guilty in state
court in an effort to create a bar to prosecution in superior court.7 But,
in this case, defendant pleaded guilty pro se in state court, and superior
court trial counsel had not attempted to manipulate the system in any

1. 240 Ga. App. 141, 522 S.E.2d 723 (1999).
2. Id. at 143, 522 S.E.2d at 724.
3. Id. at 142, 522 S.E.2d at 724.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 143, 522 S.E.2d at 724.
6. Id. (citing State v. McCrary, 253 Ga. 747, 748, 325 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1985)); see also
O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(b) (1999).
7. Powe v. State, 181 Ga. App. 429, 431, 352 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1986).
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way.8 The "well-intended but misguided acts of commission and
omission by Sheriff Stephens and the secretary who assisted him in the
district attorney's office" barred the state from further prosecution. 9
The sheriff is unlikely to take such a "compassionate measure" the next
time.
The Supreme Court of Georgia faced a jeopardy question of first
impression in Buice v. State.'° Buice had been indicted in 1994 and
again in 1996 for child molestation. Just before the cases were to be
called for trial, the State moved to nol pros the 1994 indictment and
proceed on the 1996 indictment. When the case was called for trial, the
State moved the court to vacate the nolle prosequi order and to reinstate
the 1994 indictment because the State had meant to nol pros the 1996
indictment, not the 1994 indictment. Over objection, the court vacated
its order to nol pros the 1994 indictment and, without requiring the
State to re-indict defendant, allowed the 1994 case to proceed to trial."
The supreme court ruled that
in light of well-established Georgia law regarding the plenary control
courts of record retain to revise or vacate orders and judgments during
the term at which they were entered, we hold that an order of nolle
prosequi may be vacated within the same term of court in which it was
rendered in those instances where the State has demonstrated a
meritorious reason and there is no prejudice to the accused which
would constitute a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion in
vacating the order.2

In Buice the State demonstrated a meritorious reason-the prosecutor
mistakenly tendered the wrong indictment-and Buice suffered no
prejudice because he knew that the State was prepared to proceed
against him at trial on either indictment. 3 The supreme court
4 added
that its "holding likewise applies to nol prossed accusations."1
Demurrer
In Johnson v.Athens-Clarke County,'5 a case that illustrates that no
law, however minor, should stand unchallenged in the hands of a
thorough defense lawyer, the supreme court struck down a municipal
B.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 430, 352 S.E.2d at 785.
240 Ga. App. at 143, 522 S.E.2d at 724.
272 Ga. 323, 528 S.E.2d 788 (2000).
Id. at 323, 528 S.E.2d at 789.
Id. at 326, 528 S.E.2d at 790-91.
Id.
Id.
272 Ga. 384, 529 S.E.2d 613 (2000).
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loitering ordinance for vagueness. 6 A police officer observed Johnson
sitting on a wall at the same intersection in a drug area four times over
two days, after having been told to move along. On the fifth sighting,
the officer asked Johnson whether he was visiting anyone, to which
Johnson answered no and informed the officer that he lived a mile away.
The officer asked Johnson why he was there; Johnson asked the officer
why he was harassing him. The officer answered Johnson by arresting
him. 7
Johnson was convicted in municipal court on a charge of loitering. He
appealed to the superior court, arguing that the ordinance should be
declared void for vagueness, but the court affirmed his conviction.' 8
Because he raised a constitutional challenge, Johnson appealed to the
Georgia Supreme Court. The court declared the ordinance to be vague
because, unlike the Georgia loitering statute 19 that has withstood a
vagueness attack, the ordinance added the phrase "'or under circumstances which cause a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate
concern that such person is involved in unlawful drug activity."'2 °
The ordinance failed to withstand the scrutiny of the supreme court
because
an innocent person unfamiliar with the drug culture could stand or sit
in a "known drug area" without knowing the area had such a designation, and could return to the area for a legitimate reason, or for no
reason at all, and, as the facts of this case show, be subject to arrest
and conviction. 2
The ordinance, therefore, "'does not provide fair warning to persons of
ordinary intelligence as to what it prohibits so that they may act
accordingly."' 22 The ordinance also failed because it "'affords too much
discretion
to the police'" to act in an arbitrary and discriminatory
23
way.

16. Id. at 384, 529 S.E.2d at 614.
17.
18.

Id.

Id.
19. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-36 (1998).
20. 272 Ga. at 385, 529 S.E.2d at 615 (quoting ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY, GA., MUN.
ORDINANCE § 3-5-23).
21. Id. at 386, 529 S.E.2d at 616.
22. Id. at 387, 529 S.E.2d at 616 (quoting Satterfield v. State, 260 Ga. 427, 428, 395
S.E.2d 816, 817 (1990)).
23. Id. at 388, 529 S.E.2d at 617 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64
(1999)).
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In another attack on a local ordinance, the supreme court in Thelen v.
State24 struck down as vague a Clayton County ordinance that prohibits "any ... unnecessary or unusual sound or noise which ... annoys...

others."2 5 Pete Thelen was convicted for violating this ordinance after
neighbors complained that he was repeatedly taking off and landing his
helicopter on his private dock on Lake Spivey.26 The supreme court
concluded that the ordinance did not put Thelen on notice because the
adjectives "unnecessary" and "unusual" modifying "noise" were "inherently vague."27 These vague words leave it to people of ordinary intelligence to guess at what they mean and allow police, judges, and juries to
apply them on an ad hoc basis and perhaps in arbitrary and discriminatory ways.2" So, while the supreme court did not condone any interference with the tranquility and sanctity of Thelen's neighbors, it believed
that Clayton County could do a better job in drafting its noise ordinance.
In last year's Georgia Survey, 9 we wrote about Powell v. State's"
expulsion of the state from interference in consensual sodomy between
adults in a private place.3 Defendant in Howard v. Statea2 attempted
to persuade the court to extend its reasoning in Powell to strike down
the solicitation of sodomy statute.3 3 The court declined to do so."
Perhaps Howard was not the best case in which to make such an
argument.
Howard entered the men's restroom in a restaurant while a waitress
was cleaning it. Howard locked the door, would not let the waitress
leave, then offered her "$20 for a blow job."35 She refused, so he
attempted to force her to perform sodomy. She escaped from the
restroom, and Howard was later convicted of solicitation of sodomy,
attempt to commit aggravated sodomy, and false imprisonment.3 " The
court's decision in Powell, however, does not extend the right to privacy
to sodomy generally, nor does it protect the solicitation of sodomy in

24.
25.
26.
27.

272 Ga. 81, 526 S.E.2d 60 (2000).
Id. at 82, 526 S.E.2d at 60, 62 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 81, 526 S.E.2d at 61.
Id. at 82, 526 S.E.2d at 62.

28. Id.
29. Franklin J. Hogue & Laura D. Hogue, CriminalLaw, 51 MERCER L. REV. 209, 21314 (1999).
30. 27.0 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998).
31. Id. at 336, 510 S.E.2d at 26.
32. 272 Ga. 242, 527 S.E.2d 194 (2000).
33. Id. at 242, 527 S.E.2d at 195.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36.

Id.
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particular. The court "can narrowly construe the solicitation of sodomy
statute to only punish speech soliciting sodomy that is not protected by
the Georgia Constitution's right to privacy."37 Therefore, offering to
pay for oral sex in a public place is not protected speech. Justice Sears
dissented, arguing, in essence, that it makes no sense to permit two
people to engage in sodomy but to prohibit them from talking about it
beforehand. 8 She argued that the statute should have failed constitutional muster because it is overbroad. 39
C.

CalendaringCases and Continuance

In Cuzzort v. State,4 the district attorney for the Lookout Mountain
Judicial Circuit assigned cases to particular judges and then placed
those cases on the court calendar. Cuzzort appealed this procedure,
claiming that it violated Uniform Superior Court Rule 3.1.41 The rule
provides, in pertinent part:
In multi-judge circuits, unless a majority of the judges in a circuit elect
to adopt a different system, all actions, civil and criminal, shall be
assigned by the clerk of each superior court according to a plan
approved by such judges to the end that each judge is allocated an
equal number of cases. 42
The supreme court agreed with Cuzzort and found that the Lookout
Mountain Judicial Circuit violated the clear mandate of the rule by
allowing the district attorney to make case assignments and set the
calendar.43 The court went on to find that this method constituted an
abuse of discretion under Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")
section 17-8-1 because it allowed the district attorney to call cases out
of order rather than in accord with the statute, which says that cases on
a criminal docket should be "'called in the order in which they stand on
the docket unless the defendant
is in jail or, otherwise, in the sound
44
discretion of the court.'
The question presented on appeal in Kellebrew v. State4 1 was whether
the trial court committed reversible error by requiring Kellebrew to
proceed to trial on less than seven days notice in violation of Uniform

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 244, 527 S.E.2d at 196.
Id. at 245, 527 S.E.2d at 197 (Sears, J., dissenting).
Id. at 246, 527 S.E.2d at 197-98.
271 Ga. 464, 519 S.E.2d 687 (1999).
Id. at 464, 519 S.E.2d at 688.

42.

UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 3.1 (2000).

43. 271 Ga. at 465, 519 S.E.2d at 689.
44. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-8-1 (1997)).

45. 239 Ga. App. 783, 521 S.E.2d 921 (1999).
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Superior Court Rule 32.1 after Kellebrew refused to withdraw his
demand for speedy trial.4" The court of appeals answered no.47
Kellebrew's demand for trial would have resulted in an acquittal had the
State not tried him before December 31, 1995. Kellebrew received notice
from the trial court on December 19, 1995, that his case would be called
for trial the next day, December 20, 1995. Kellebrew refused to
withdraw his demand and to allow the case to go to trial on January 2,
1996, so the court proceeded with his trial.4" His conviction and two
consecutive twenty-year sentences were affirmed.49
D. Demand for Trial
In Vedder v. State,5" a DUI case, defendant Vedder filed a demand
in municipal court for a speedy trial by jury. Because municipal courts
do not empanel juries, the case was transferred to state court.
Defendant did not file a speedy trial demand in the state court.
Defendant made a motion for a plea in bar (noncompliance with the
original speedy trial demand) in the state court. The court of appeals
upheld the trial court's denial of the plea in bar.5 It held that a
speedy trial demand in a municipal court is ineffective and that
defendant did not refile an effective demand in the state court.
E. Suppression
As in previous years, Fourth Amendment and state statutory
proscriptions against unlawful searches and seizures generated the
largest number of opinions concerning a single topic. Because the vast
majority of these opinions turn on the peculiar facts of each case, this
year we offer a cursory review by highlighting what we consider to be
some of the more interesting cases having to do with the various
configurations of search and seizure issues.
1. Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights as Probation Condition. In Fox v. State,55 the Georgia Supreme Court held that David
Fox did not waive his Fourth Amendment right to privacy when he was
on probation and a probation officer required him to sign a waiver

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 784, 521 S.E.2d
Id.
Id. at 785, 521 S.E.2d
Id. at 787, 521 S.E.2d
241 Ga. App. 578, 527
Id. at 579, 527 S.E.2d

at 924.
at 924.
at 925.
S.E.2d 249 (1999).
at 250.

52. Id.
53.

272 Ga. 163, 527 S.E.2d 847 (2000).
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allowing a search of his person, houses, papers, or effects any time of
day or night with or without a search warrant whenever such a search
was requested by a probation officer or a law enforcement officer.54 A
deputy received a tip that Fox was selling marijuana out of his house.
The deputy did a criminal records search and discovered that Fox was
on probation. Armed with Fox's signed search waiver, the deputy
appeared at Fox's house and requested a search.55 Fox consented
because he "didn't think [he] had any choice."56 The deputy found
marijuana and a firearm.57
While a probationer's standing Fourth Amendment waiver can be
valid, Fox's was not.58 The only time such a waiver will support a
search is when the defendant agrees to that waiver as a part of his
negotiated plea.5 9 The record in this case showed that the issue never
arose in Fox's plea hearing or in negotiations and that he was first
presented with the waiver by his probation officer, who required Fox to
sign it.6 0 Such a waiver will not withstand a Fourth Amendment
attack.6 1
2. Scope of Search. When a police officer makes a lawful stop of
an automobile based upon the driver's failure to wear a seat belt, warns
the driver about that infraction-at which time the driver is free to
leave-then asks the passenger if he can search her purse, and discovers
drugs, will the court of appeals uphold that search as lawful? Yes, it
will, but it should not according to Judges Ruffin and Blackburn who
dissented in State v. Milsap.6 2 The dissenting judges argued that the
police exceeded the scope of their authority to ask the search question
when the basis for the stop ended.63 "[Plolice officers do not have carte
blanche to question motorists after having stopped them for a traffic
violation. Rather, in order to justify additional questioning of motorists
following a routine traffic stop, 'an officer must have reasonable

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 163, 527 S.E.2d at 848.
Id. at 164, 527 S.E.2d at 849.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165, 527 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. at 164, 527 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. at 165, 527 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. at 167, 527 S.E.2d at 850-51.
State v. Milsap, 243 Ga. App. 519, 528 S.E.2d 865 (2000).
Id. at 520, 528 S.E.2d at 867 (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
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suspicion of criminal conduct."''

4

But, of course, this was not the

majority view in this case.
Milsap is difficult to accord with Migliore v. State,65 in which an
officer pulled over Migliore's car for weaving. Migliore explained that he
had been traveling from South Carolina and was tired. He produced a
valid driver's license and a rental contract. He told the officer that his
boss had rented the car and then loaned it to him. Migliore described
his passenger, Tootle, as his girlfriend. The officer then questioned
Tootle. She told the officer that she did not know who rented the car.
Unlike Migliore, she described him as her friend. She indicated that she
had been in South Carolina for less time than Migliore had mentioned
he had been there. The officer then walked his drug dog around the car.
When the dog alerted, the officer and the dog went into the car. The
officer found drugs and $40,000.66
The court of appeals concluded that the officer exceeded the scope of
a permissible investigatory stop because he had no reasonable suspicion
to detain Migliore to search for drugs.6 7
Reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate for illicit drug activity
does not arise from nervousness, differing statements regarding
whether a relationship is romantic, or the length of time spent at a
previous destination. The statements attributed to Tootle and Migliore
are not meaningful inconsistencies. Tootle and Migliore may have gone
to South Carolina at different times, and it is not uncommon for
individuals to have different perceptions of the nature of their
relationship. Also, Tootle did not say someone other than Migliore's
boss had rented the car. She said she did not know. Under the
totality of the circumstances, we find that [the officer] exceeded the
scope of permissible investigation. 8
The court of appeals reached a similar result in State v. Blair.9 In
Blair a state trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding. The vehicle had a
drive out tag and contained four occupants. The trooper questioned the
driver and the front seat passenger as to ownership of the vehicle. The
trooper testified that he became suspicious when neither produced proof
of ownership, they provided conflicting explanations concerning the
purpose of their journey, all four appeared very nervous, and defendant,

64.
S.E.2d
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 521, 528 S.E.2d at 868 (quoting Edwards v. State, 239 Ga. App 44, 45, 518
426, 428 (1999)).
240 Ga. App. 783, 525 S.E.2d at 166 (1999).
Id. at 783, 525 S.E.2d at 167.
Id. at 786, 525 S.E.2d at 169.
Id.
239 Ga. App. 340, 521 S.E.2d 380 (1999).
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who was seated in the rear, clutched a black bag. The trooper then
asked the purported owner, the front seat passenger, for permission to
search the car. He respectfully declined. The four were detained while
a canine unit was summoned.7"
While waiting for the dog, defendant fled with his bag, was apprehended and found to be in possession of marijuana, baggies, and
scales.71 The trial court held that the detention of the occupants in
order to search for drugs was unlawful. The court of appeals agreed.72
In a case that seems to be at odds with Milsap, the court of appeals
affirmed the granting of a motion to suppress in State v. Hanson. An
officer stopped a car that was weaving within its own lane. The officer
learned that the driver was not intoxicated and found no basis for
detaining him. He told the driver he was free to leave, but as Hanson
put his hand on the door to go, the officer ordered him to halt. He then
requested and got permission to search Hanson's car, in which he found
marijuana. 74 The trial court reached the following pertinent conclusions of law, to which the court of appeals, Judge Blackburn presiding,
gave its imprimatur:
4. The investigatory encounter authorized by the officer's observation of the weaving of Defendants' vehicle ended when the officer told
Defendant Hanson he was free to leave and said Defendant left the
location where he had spoken with the officer and put his hand on his
vehicle door.
5. The conversation between Defendants and the officer, which
disclosed that Defendant Hanson was a professional musician, the fact
that said Defendant had long hair and a full beard, and the fact he was
driving a vehicle with tinted windows and appeared to be nervous did
not constitute probable cause for an additional investigatory encounter.
6. The consent of Defendants to a search of the vehicle was obtained
outside the scope of a permissible investigatory encounter with a law
enforcement officer. It was the product of an improper restriction
placed upon their freedom of movement, because it occurred after the
justifiable restriction on their freedom of movement warranted by the
investigative stop for weaving had been terminated, pursuant to the
officer's representation that the encounter had ended. The officer

70. Id. at 340, 521 S.E.2d at 381.
71. Id. at 341, 521 S.E.2d at 381-82.
72. Id. at 342, 521 S.E.2d at 382. The court relied upon Smith v. State, 216 Ga. App.
453,455,454 S.E.2d 635, 637 (1995) (holding detention was impermissible when officer had
no reasonable suspicion of drug activity), and Simmons v. State, 223 Ga. App. 781, 479
S.E.2d 123 (1996).
73. 243 Ga. App. 532, 532, 532 S.E.2d 715, 717 (2000).
74. Id. at 533, 532 S.E.2d at 717.
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therefore had no legal basis for ordering Defendant Hanson to
interrupt his departure from the scene after he had begun to do so."
3. Visitors on Premises Where Search Warrant Executed. In
State v. Holmes,7" police officers executed a search warrant at the
McClendon home based upon probable cause to believe that they would
find cocaine. When the police arrived, they saw McClendon standing in
the yard talking to Willie Holmes. The search warrant did not name
Holmes, nor did the officers know who he was." The warrant did
authorize the officers to search "the entire premises and any persons
found therein or thereupon."7" An officer approached Holmes and
identified himself, at which time Holmes turned to run. The officer
caught him and ordered him to remove his hands from his pockets. The
officer then conducted a pat-down search, felt a cookie of crack cocaine,
removed it, and arrested Holmes. At Holmes' suppression hearing, the
officers testified that Holmes was detained because he was on premises
subject to a search warrant, and it was the policy of the drug task force
to conduct a weapons pat-down search of anyone on premises subject to
a search warrant.7 9 However,
[wihen executing a search warrant, it is illegal to search a person not
named in the warrant but found on the premises to be searched,
without independent justification for a personal search. The only
justifications for such a search include: (1) protecting the executing
officer from attack; or (2) preventing the disposal or concealment of
items described in the search warrant. The inclusion of language in
the warrant authorizing the search of "any persons present" on the
premises does not broaden the powers of the searching authorities
beyond the limited terms of OCGA § 17-5-28." °
The search of Holmes, therefore, was illegal."'
4. Reasonable Suspicion and Probable Cause. In State v.
Williams, 2 the only thing that separated Malik Williams from freedom
and a conviction for trafficking in cocaine was the absence of a bulge in
his pants. Had the Drug Enforcement Authority ("DEA") officer seen a
bulge, the court of appeals would have reversed the trial court's

75. Id. at 534, 532 S.E.2d at 718.
76. 240 Ga. App. 332, 525 S.E.2d 698 (1999).
77. Id. at 333, 525 S.E.2d at 699.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 333, 525 S.E.2d at 700.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citations omitted).
82. 242 Ga. App. 34, 528 S.E.2d 554 (2000).
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suppression of the evidence that Williams was carrying 407 grams of
cocaine taped to his, leg while departing a plane that had just carried
him from Miami to Atlanta. 3
Officer Shelton of the DEA Task Force in Atlanta, along with his
partner, sought information at the Atlanta airport on persons who met
their drug courier profile. 4 They were looking for people who "flew on
short notice, paid for their tickets in cash and checked no baggage.""
Williams met this description, so the officers approached him as he came
out of the gate area and asked to speak to him. He agreed. Shelton
asked for Williams' ticket; he provided it. Shelton asked a few other
questions, all of which Williams answered, even though he changed one
of his answers when pressed. Shelton noticed that Williams was
nervous: His hands shook, his jaw clenched, and Shelton could see
Williams' heart pounding through his shirt.8
Williams consented to Shelton's request to search his backpack and his
person. After searching his backpack, Williams withdrew his consent to
any further search. Shelton and his partner then took him to their office
in Fulton County, where a drug dog alerted on Williams' backpack. An
hour and a half later, the officers acquired a search warrant from a
Clayton County magistrate. Upon searching Williams, they found the
cocaine taped to his leg, some marijuana in his shoe, and more than one
thousand dollars in his pocket.8 7
The court of appeals concluded that Williams' detention was not
supported by probable cause based upon the facts cited above. 8
Presence of a bulge would have given the officers probable cause, thus
distinguishing this case from two others that went against the defendants solely because of the bulge factor.89
In the DUI arena, the court of appeals evaluated a traffic stop for
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.90 In Howden v. State,9 the
court of appeals ruled that the trial court erred in denying the motion
to suppress and reversed the conviction.92 Based upon the evidence,
defendant stayed late at work and consumed alcohol. About 10:15 p.m.

83. Id. at 37, 528 S.E.2d at 557.
84. Id. at 34, 528 S.E.2d at 555.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 35, 528 S.E.2d at 555.
87. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 556.
88. Id. at 37, 528 S.E.2d at 557.
89. Clark v. State, 183 Ga. App. 838, 840, 360 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1987); Miller v. State,
183 Ga. App. 702, 702, 359 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1987).
90. Howden v. State, 240 Ga. App. 139, 140, 522 S.E.2d 279, 280 (1999).
91. 240 Ga. App. 139, 522 S.E.2d 279 (1999):
92. Id. at 141, 522 S.E.2d at 281.
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he got in, his van and headed home but was stopped by the police and
arrested for DUI. The officer testified that he stopped defendant because
it was late and the warehouse where defendant did business was located
in an area known- for criminal activity.9 3 The officer further testified
that his suspicions were first aroused because "defendant's van was
backed into one of the [closed warehouse's] doors." 4 The officer did not
state any particular fact indicating that the occupant of the van was or
was about to be engaged in criminal activity.95 The court of appeals
held that a warehouse in an area known for criminal activity and a van
leaving that warehouse late at night did not justify a traffic stop. 9
5. Surreptitious Audio-taped Telephone Conversations. In
Bishop v. State,97 a case that caused the court of appeals much consternation and prompted the General Assembly to change the law, Kyle
Richard Bishop persuaded the court to reverse the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress audio-taped phone conversations between himself
and a thirteen-year-old female neighbor he was accused of molesting.9"
Suspicious that Bishop had evil intent toward her daughter, the girl's
mother listened in a phone conversation between Bishop and her
daughter, only to hear them talking in sexual terms and plotting the
girl's parents' deaths. The parents contacted the police, who refused to
wiretap their phone line. So, the parents bought a recorder and tapped
the phone themselves. They recorded numerous incriminating phone
calls from Bishop.99
The parents turned over the tapes to the police, who eventually
arrested Bishop. Bishop filed a motion to suppress, citing O.C.G.A.
section 16-11-62, which prohibits the interception or recording of phone
If one
calls by any person who is not a party to the conversation. 10
party to,the conversation is a minor, then phone calls may be intercepted, but only after application to the superior court and only after the
superior court makes certain findings of probable cause and determines
that the child will not be harmed."' The remedy for a violation of
these statutes is suppression of the taped phone calls. 10 2 The court

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 140, 522 S.E.2d at 280.
Id.
Id., 522 S.E.2d at 281.
Id.
241 Ga. App. 517, 526 S.E.2d 917 (1999).
Id. at 517, 526 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 518, 526 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 519, 526 S.E.2d at 919.
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66(b), (c)(1), (c)(3) (Supp. 2000).
Id. § 16-11-67 (1998).
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"reluctantly" agreed with Bishop and reversed the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress.' 3 The court went on, however, to invite
legislative change of the law in order to avoid this result. 10 4 The
Georgia General Assembly obliged, amending O.C.G.A section 16-11-66
several weeks after Bishop. The statute now expressly allows parents
to tape their children's conversations from an "extension phone located
within the family home." 105 But can a parent secretly tape a phone
call from a neighbor's phone? We should find out this year.'0 6
6. Exigent Circumstances. The propriety of police entry into a
suspect's home was analyzed in Threatt v. State.0 7 In Threatt a
citizen saw a man driving in an erratic manner. While speaking with
police, the citizen followed defendant to his home. The police arrived at
defendant's home nearly twenty minutes after the citizen began
watching the car. The officers knocked on the door and a woman
answered. Without a warrant or consent, the officers entered the home
to investigate the man who matched the description. The officers began
questioning defendant inside his home. Then the officers asked
defendant to exit his home and continued their DUI investigation.0 8
The court held that if exigent circumstances exist, an officer can enter
a home without a warrant. 10 9 Here, the exigent circumstances, the
dangerous operation of a car, had ceased. Thus, all evidence discovered
inside the home should have been suppressed. However, the evidence
discovered outside the home was not considered part of the unlawful
search and seizure and was therefore admissible."0
7. Chemical Tests and Implied Consent. In the field of DUI law,
there were several important cases focusing on the issue of the
admissibility of tests for alcohol and drugs and whether the warnings
preceding the testing were administered lawfully. One of the most
significant of these decisions was Love v. State."' In Love the Georgia
Supreme Court held that the portion of the DUI statute that distinguished between medically prescribed marijuana and recreational use

103. 241 Ga. App. at 519, 526 S.E.2d at 919.
104. Id. at 524, 526 S.E.2d at 922.
105. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-66(d) (Supp. 2000).
106. The authors have one such case pending now in the court of appeals.
107. 240 Ga. App. 592, 524 S.E.2d 276 (1999).
108. Id. at 594, 524 S.E.2d at 279.

109. Id. at 596, 524 S.E.2d at 280.
110. Id. at 597, 524 S.E.2d at 281.
111.

271 Ga. 398, 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999).
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marijuana is unconstitutional." 2 Prior to this case, a blood or urine
test revealing marijuana metabolites in a driver's system when there
was no prescription for the marijuana, constituted a per se violation of
the DUI statute. 3 On the other hand, a blood or urine test revealing
marijuana metabolites, when the driver had a prescription for marijuana, required the State to prove that the ingestion of marijuana caused
the defendant to be incapable of driving safely."4
This case does not necessarily mean that a DUI marijuana case goes
away. It only means that the State cannot make a per se case based on
the presence of marijuana. Note that in DUI prescription drug cases the
standard of proof is higher than in other alcohol and drug cases.
In State v. Becker,"' four persons were killed when a tractor trailer
forced their van into oncoming traffic. A witness got the tag number of
the tractor trailer, which left the scene. A trooper stopped the truck, but
the circumstances of the stop are unknown. Another trooper met
defendant and followed him ten miles back to the Tifton patrol post.
The trooper read the implied consent notice and asked for a urine
sample, which defendant provided. The trooper subsequently drove
defendant to the hospital, reread the implied consent notice for
commercial drivers, and asked for a blood test, to which defendant
submitted. Based on the results of the blood and urine tests, defendant
was charged with DUI and vehicular homicide. He moved to suppress
the test results on several grounds, and the trial court granted his
motion. The State appealed." 6
The first issue was whether the implied consent notice was read in a
timely manner. "' The court of appeals ruled that the evidence was
insufficient for the trial court to determine whether the implied consent
notice was read in a timely manner."' The case was remanded to the
trial court for further evidence to determine this issue." 9
A second issue in this case is interesting because the court of appeals
never has ruled on it. Defendant's attorney argued that the implied
consent notice for commercial drivers notified defendant that he would
be disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for one year if he
refused the testing but did not notify him that he would also be

112. Id. at 403, 517 S.E.2d at 57.
113. Id. at 402, 517 S.E.2d at 55.
114. Id.
115. 240 Ga. App. 267, 523 S.E.2d 98 (1999).
116. Id. at 267-68, 523 S.E.2d at 99-100.
117. Id. at 269, 523 S.E.2d at 101.
118. Id. at 270, 523 S.E.2d at 101.
119. Id. at 273, 523 S.E.2d at 103.
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disqualified from operating a personal vehicle. 2 ° The court of appeals
found that defendant agreed to take the test after hearing that a refusal
to take the test could result in a suspension of his commercial driver's
license for a year. 12' The court reasoned that being told that he would
also lose his personal driving privileges could only have tipped the
balance further
in favor of consenting.'2 2 Therefore, the omission was
123
immaterial.
The training manual for the Intoxilyzer 5000 requires a twenty-minute
wait in a controlled environment to ensure that the breath sample is not
contaminated with extraneous alcohol.' 24 Does a violation of this rule
go to the weight or the admissibility of the results? In Casey v.
State,"25
' the court of appeals, in dicta, said that the State must
follow
26
the published guidelines for the breath test to be admissible.
Until Casey the appellate courts have held that noncompliance with
the waiting period goes to the weight and credibility of the test result,
not its admissibility. However, in Casey defendant's initial breath test
indicated the presence of mouth alcohol, and the officer did not wait the
required twenty minutes before retesting. 27 The court of appeals said
that the failure to observe the twenty-minute waiting period prior to
retesting "compromised the very foundation for admission of defendant's
breath test."2 ' Yet, it was harmless
error given "the overwhelming
129
evidence of Defendant's guilt."
Even suppressed breath test results can be admitted to impeach the
defendant's testimony. In Jones v. State,3 0 the State's breath test was
not admitted into evidence at trial. On cross examination during the
trial, defendant testified that he had one beer at 8:30 p.m. and two beers
between 10 p.m. and 12 p.m. He also testified that he weighed two
hundred pounds. On rebuttal the trial court allowed the State to admit
the test result to impeach defendant's testimony.'3 ' The court of
appeals held that the test result (0.09g) was admissible to impeach
defendant's testimony. This opinion is remarkable because there is no

120. Id. at 270, 523 S.E.2d at 101.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 272, 523 S.E.2d at 102.
123. Id.
124. Casey v. State, 240 Ga. App. 329, 331 n.1, 523 S.E.2d 395, 396 n.1 (1999).
125. 240 Ga. App. 329, 523 S.E.2d 395 (1999).
126. Id. at 331, 523 S.E.2d at 396.
127. Id. at 331 n.1, 523 S.E.2d at 396 n.1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 241 Ga. App. 515, 527 S.E.2d 223 (1999).
131. Id. at 516, 527 S.E.2d at 224.
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indication that the State introduced any evidence that the test result
was inconsistent
with defendant's testimony other than the result
32
itself.

1

Must a defendant receive Miranda warnings prior to being asked to
participate in breath or urine tests? In State v. Coe,"3 the court of
appeals reversed State v. Warmack,"3 holding that the state does not
have to prove the administration of Miranda warnings for the results to
be admissible.'3 5
In Coe the court of appeals reversed the trial court's suppression of the
results of defendant's urine test.'3 6 After being arrested, defendant
was read the implied consent notice and agreed to take a breath test.
The officer read implied consent notice again, requesting a urine test.
Defendant agreed, but never received Mirandawarnings. The trial court
relied on Warmack in suppressing the results of the urine test. 3 7 The
court of appeals overruled Warmack by holding that an arrestee is not
entitled to Miranda warnings before deciding whether to submit to the
State's request for an additional test of breath, blood, or urine.'38 The
court distinguished between submitting to chemical testing and
performing incriminating acts such as field sobriety tests.1 39 Accordingly, an arrestee is entitled to Miranda warnings before submitting to
field sobriety tests.
Extrinsic Evidence
While the notice and hearing requirements of Uniform Superior Court
Rules 31.1 and 31.3 no longer apply to the admissibility of prior
difficulties between the accused and the alleged victim, the trial court
bears an obligation to conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of such
prior difficulties when the accused has been tried and acquitted of
them. 4 ° In Scott v. State,' defendant Scott beat and pistol whipped
a woman he lived with; the State sought to introduce prior difficulties,
among which was a 1993 acquittal of simple battery involving Scott and
the same woman. The court allowed this evidence without examining
the case file to determine what facts were in issue and resolved in
F

132. Id.
133. 243 Ga. App. 232, 533 S.E.2d 104 (2000).
134. 230 Ga. App. 157, 495 S.E.2d 632 (1998).
135. 243 Ga. App. at 234, 533 S.E.2d at 107.
136. Id. at 234-35, 533 S.E.2d at 107.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 234, 533 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 235, 533 S.E.2d at 107.
Scott v. State, 243 Ga. App. 383, 387, 532 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2000).
243 Ga. App. 383, 532 S.E.2d 141 (2000).
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defendant's favor at trial. The State's avowed purpose for using this
prior difficulty was to prove Scott's course of conduct and bent of mind.
Scott, however, had received a general verdict of not guilty on the prior
difficulty. 142 Because the State bears the burden of proving that
defendant committed the extrinsic act, and the prior jury acquitted him
of it, the court committed error by admitting this evidence without
further proof by the State that defendant committed it. 143 The error

was harmless, however, because overwhelming evidence of defendant's
guilt existed without the prior difficulties evidence, rendering it highly
probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.'"
G. Discovery
By far the most important case in the area of discovery during this
reporting period was State v. Lucious. 45 In this case the Georgia
Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, upheld the constitutionality of the
Criminal Discovery Act' 46 and held that a defendant who opted not to
participate in the Act was not entitled to the state's scientific reports,
scientific work product, or
witness lists. 147 The court overruled Eason
4 in so holding. 49
v. State

An election not to invoke the reciprocal discovery provisions of the Act
entitles a defendant only to "that discovery specifically afforded by the
Georgia and United States Constitutions, statutory exceptions to the Act,
and nonconflicting rules of court." 5 ° Scientific reports and scientific
work product are not afforded to a defendant anywhere outside the Act,
so the trial court erred in requiring the State to provide these to Lucious
when he had not invoked the Act.'
The trial court also erred in
requiring the State to provide its witness list to Lucious pursuant to
Uniform Superior Court Rule 30.3 because this rule conflicts with
O.C.G.A. sections 17-16-3 and 17-16-8, thereby rendering the rule
unenforceable.152

While cases may exist in which the defendant perceives a strategic
advantage in not invoking the Criminal Discovery Act, Lucious seems to

142. Id. at 386-87, 532 S.E.2d at 144-46.
143. Id., 532 S.E.2d at 146.
144. Id.
145. 271 Ga. 361, 518 S.E.2d 677 (1999).
146. O.C.G.A. §§ 17-16-1 to 17-16-23 (1997).
147. 243 Ga. App. at 365, 518 S.E.2d at 681.
148. 260 Ga. 445, 396 S.E.2d 492 (1990).
149. 271 Ga. at 365, 518 S.E.2d at 681.
150. Id. at 364, 518 S.E.2d at 681.
151. Id. at 365, 518 S.E.2d at 681.
152. Id. at 365-66, 518 S.E.2d at 681-82.

2000]

CRIMINAL LAW

185

limit those cases to ones in which scientific evidence does not exist and
those in which the defendant already knows the identity and location of
the State's witnesses without having received their names on a witness
list. In our view the better approach after Lucious is to begin with a
presumption in favor of invoking the Act unless that presumption can be
rebutted by sound strategic reasons to the contrary.
The court of appeals reversed a conviction in Harridge v. State,"' a
vehicular homicide case, because of a Brady violation by the State.'
Whether the court will reverse a Brady violation turns on the facts of
each case, but in every instance the defendant must prove the existence
of four factors:
(1) the state possessed evidence favorable to the defense, (2) the
accused did not possess the evidence and could not have obtained it
through reasonable diligence, (3) the state suppressed the favorable
evidence, and (4) a reasonable probability exists that disclosure
5 of the
evidence would have altered the outcome of the proceedings."1
Harridge met all four of these conditions. The prosecutor possessed
exculpatory evidence concerning the presence of cocaine and marijuana
in the decedent driver's urine, Harridge could not have obtained it, the
state did not reveal it to Harridge, and the court concluded that the
evidence may have altered the outcome of the case." 6 This last
condition, in many cases, may be the most difficult to meet. Note that
the court in Harridgesaid, "[W]e cannot say with any degree of certainty
that the jury's verdict would not have been different if it had heard
evidence that Smith may have been under the influence of cocaine and
marijuana at the time of the accident."" 7 We wonder if, in effect, this
way of putting it dilutes the defendant's burden by requiring the court
to find that the verdict would not have resulted in an acquittal rather
than requiring the defendant to prove that the verdict would have
resulted in an acquittal. Is there a real difference in burdens?
In a case that reminds all defense lawyers how easy it is to waive an
issue for appeal that would have reversed a conviction, Dickerson v.
State"'1 involved a failure by defense counsel to seek an appropriate
remedy-in this case a continuance-when confronted with the State's
failure to comply with the Criminal Discovery Act. The State failed to

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

243 Ga. App. 658, 534 S.E.2d 113 (2000).
Id. at 659, 534 S.E.2d at 115.
Id. at 660, 534 S.E.2d at 116 (citations omitted).
Id. at 660-62, 534 S.E.2d at 116-17.
Id. at 662, 534 S.E.2d at 117.
241 Ga. App. 593, 526 S.E.2d 443 (1999).
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give the defense the birth date of a witness. Defendant filed a motion
to compel the information, but the State did not comply. At trial
defendant failed to move for a continuance. The witness testified, and
Dickerson discovered after trial that the witness had a conviction for a
crime of moral turpitude, which defendant could have used to impeach
her.'59 We suppose that trial counsel will have the opportunity to
discuss the matter further at the habeas hearing that is sure to follow.
H.

Jurisdiction
In Weatherbed v. State, 60 somebody missed a crucial phrase in
O.C.G.A. section 17-7-70(a) 161 when the Crisp County Superior Court
accepted a guilty plea to malice murder by defendant, whose counsel
advised him to waive indictment by the grand jury and plead guilty to
an accusation carrying a life sentence by the district attorney. 162 The
supreme court reversed the denial of defendant Weatherbed's motion for
an out-of-time appeal, noting that the trial court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction to accept the guilty plea in the first place.6 3 The
court based its decision on O.C.G.A. section 17-7-70(a) and (b), which
provide: "In all felony cases, other than cases involving capital felonies,
...the district attorney shall have authority to prefer accusations, and
such defendants shall be tried on such accusations, provided that
defendants going to trial under such accusations shall, in writing, waive
indictment by a grand jury," and
Judges of the superior court may open their courts at any time without
the presence of either a grand jury or a trial jury to receive and act
upon pleas of guilty in misdemeanor cases and in felony cases, except
those punishable by death or life imprisonment, when the judge and
the defendant consent thereto. -Thejudge may try the issues in such
cases without a jury upon an accusation filed by the district attorney
where the defendant has waived indictment and consented thereto in
writing and counsel is present in court representing the defendant
64
either by virtue of his employment or by appointment by the court.
Thus, without an indictment, the trial court possessed no subject matter
jurisdiction to accept Weatherbed's guilty plea or to impose a sentence
on him.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 595, 526 S.E.2d at 446.
271 Ga. 736, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999).
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70(a) (1997).
271 Ga. at 736, 524 S.E.2d at 452.
Id. at 738, 524 S.E.2d at 453.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-70(a), (b).
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GUILTY PLEA

Maybe he changed his mind after he heard the evidence. Maybe he
never had his mind made up at all until he heard the evidence. Either
way, a judge who gets involved in plea negotiations runs the risk of
enticing a defendant to give up an important right in the belief that
things will turn out better in the end, only to find out that things could
6 5 while high on
not have turned out worse. In McDaniel v. State,"
cocaine, defendant shot each of his grandparents and his ten-year-old
brother in the head, killing all three. He confessed to the murders and
pleaded guilty believing that the court would impose a sentence of life
without parole only to hear the judge pronounce a death sentence. 66
The supreme court reversed his conviction and death sentence because
during plea negotiations the trial judge virtually assured McDaniel that
if he pleaded guilty and allowed the court to impose sentence, he would
get life without parole rather than death.'67 McDaniel's decision to
plead and dispense with a jury during the penalty phase was induced by
these comments by the judge:
I have indicated to [all counsel] that the court would be reluctant as an
individual or as a judge to impose a death sentence. My personal
philosophy is that if that is done it ought to be done by a jury and not
by a judge. Now that's completely my opinion. I'm not saying I'm not
committing to that. There was some indication that if the court
reversed that decision based on the facts and circumstances the counsel
would request an immediate withdrawal but I am not-I am not in a

mind to impose a death sentence as an individual. I just think that is
something that should be relegated and the duties that a jury
should-that's their sworn duty. Of course, I would be the jury and the
judge all at the same time. That's the court's feeling and I will listen
to both sides, I'll listen about life, I'll listen to life without parole and
I'll listen to the recommendation for death but I'm 90 percent certain
that I would impose a life without parole sentence. 6 '
For good reason, state and federal rules prohibit judicial participation
in plea negotiations.'6 9 "Due to the force and majesty of the judiciary,
a trial court's participation in the plea negotiation may skew the
defendant's decision-making and render the plea involuntary because a

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

271 Ga. 552, 522 S.E.2d 648 (1999).
Id. at 553, 522 S.E.2d at 649.
Id. at 554, 522 S.E.2d at 650.
Id. at 553, 522 S.E.2d at 649.
UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 33.5(A) (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1) (1999).
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defendant may disregard proper considerations and waive rights based
solely on the trial court's stated inclination as to sentence." 7 °
IV. JURY SELECTION

While the court must grant a defendant's motion to strike for cause
when a potential juror works in the very district attorney's office who is
prosecuting the case, no such motion must be granted if the potential
172
7
juror is a prosecutor for another jurisdiction.' ' In Floyd v. State,
a potential juror worked for the local federal prosecutor, so there was
no
173
error in denying a motion to strike for cause on that basis alone.
V.

STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF

A.

Hearsay
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed a malice murder conviction in
Lindsey v. State 74 because the trial court improperly permitted
prejudicial and unreliable hearsay evidence that incriminated Lindsey. 71 Over objection the trial court admitted the hearsay testimony
of a witness who stated that after the shooting and while he was talking
to police officers investigating the crimes, he heard a member of the
crowd gathered around the victim's residence yell at him to tell the
police that Lindsey was the shooter.'76 The Georgia Supreme Court
held that the testimony did not fit into any articulated exception to the
prohibition against hearsay'77 and reversed the conviction. 78 The
inadmissible hearsay evidence was so incriminating and not cumulative
of other admissible evidence that the court was unable to conclude that
the testimony did not contribute to the verdict.7 9
An essential element of a crime may not be proven by hearsay alone.
In Ledford v.State, 8 ° the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed Ledford's

170. 271 Ga. at 554, 522 S.E.2d at 650 (citing Skomer v. State, 183 Ga. App. 308, 310,
358 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1997)).
171. Floyd v. State, 272 Ga. 65, 67, 525 S.E.2d 683, 685 (2000).
172. 272 Ga. 65, 525 S.E.2d 683 (2000).
173. Id. at 67, 525 S.E.2d at 685.
174. 271 Ga. 657, 522 S.E.2d 459 (1999).
175. Id. at 659, 522 S.E.2d at 461.
176. Id.
177. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-1 (1995).
178. 271 Ga. at 659, 522 S.E.2d at 460.
179. Id., 522 S.E.2d at 461.
180. 239 Ga. App. 237, 520 S.E.2d 225 (1999).
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conviction of intentionally inhaling paint fumes.'' The elements of
this offense are codified in O.C.G.A. section 16-13-91.182 The State had
to prove that the paint inhaled by defendant contained the chemical
toluene. To do so, the State introduced the contents label from the spray
paint can Ledford had used. 8 3 This label, alone, the court of appeals
ruled, is insufficient as a matter of law to prove an essential element of
the crime because it is hearsay."M Absent a recognized exception for
this evidence, the State cannot prove the truth of the matter it asserts
simply by the introduction of hearsay.'85
The chemical toluene also made an appearance in a DUI case as an
element of the defense's case. In Cornell v. State,8 6 defendant's breath
test results were .157. At trial the owner of a body shop testified that
defendant spent the day of his arrest in the paint shop while a car was
being painted. The owner testified that the paint contained toluene and
that defendant must have inhaled that substance. Although defendant's
attorney labeled certain documents regarding the paint as defense
exhibits, they were never admitted into evidence because the attorney
did not lay a proper foundation for their admission. Defendant's
attorney called an expert witness to testify about the effect of inhaling
paint fumes on breath tests. The trial court ruled that the expert could
testify only about the effect of toluene because that was the only
substance proved to be in the paint.'8 7 In holding that defendant's
argument was without merit, the court of appeals said that "not even an
expert can give an opinion based entirely upon reports which have been
prepared by others and which are not in evidence." 88
Also in the area of DUI law, the qualifications of the person who
draws the defendant's blood to test for alcohol level is an essential
element of the State's case. Therefore, as the court held in Peek v.
State," 9 it cannot be proven exclusively through hearsay. 9 ' Charged
with DUI, Peek agreed to submit to a state-administered blood test. At
trial the court permitted the State to introduce, as a business record, a
"computer print-out" of an employee education cumulative report to show

181. Id. at 241, 520 S.E.2d at 229.
182. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-91 (1998).
183. 239 Ga. App. at 238, 520 S.E.2d at 226.
184. Id. at 241, 520 S.E.2d at 228-29.
185. Id., 520 S.E.2d at 229.
186. 239 Ga. App. 127, 520 S.E.2d 782 (1999).
187. Id. at 127, 520 S.E.2d at 783.
188. Id. (quoting Leonard v. State, 269 Ga. 867, 871, 506 S.E.2d 853, 857 (1998))
(citation and punctuation omitted).
189. 272 Ga. 169, 527 S.E.2d 552 (2000).
190. Id. at 170, 527 S.E.2d at 554.
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that the drawer of blood was qualified.1 91 The supreme court reversed
defendant's conviction, holding that the trial court erred in permitting
the State to introduce the print out to satisfy its burden of proving the
qualifications of the blood drawer. 9 2 The supreme court held that
because the established methods for proving the qualifications of persons
who draw blood infringe on defendant's confrontation rights, the courts
must resist the temptation to expand the class of acceptable methods.193 Accordingly, the methods established in O.C.G.A. section 40-6392(e)' 94 are the exclusive methods, other than testimony from the
blood drawer, of proving the qualifications of the person who draws
blood.'95 The trial court thus erred in allowing the State to admit the
196
private hospital records for the purpose of proving the qualifications.
B.

PrejudicialEvidence

To reverse a conviction based upon the improper admission by the trial
court of prejudicial evidence, the reviewing court must first conclude that
the evidence was improperly admitted and then conclude that the
admission of the evidence called for the granting of a mistrial. In
Martin v. State,'97 a jury convicted Martin of armed robbery.' 9
During the trial defense counsel cross-examined the officer who took
Martin's recorded confession as follows:
MARTIN'S COUNSEL: What was talked about before the tape
turned on...?
REDLINGER: More than likely I went in and, of course, introduced
myself. I described the situation to him as far as what we had, what
the victim said, what witnesses said, asked him if he would like to
speak to us about the situation, and these are things he needs to think
about when he makes his decision on whether he wanted to talk to us
or not. And I also mentioned that I was familiar with his criminal
history. 99
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Id. at 172, 527 S.E.2d at 555.
Id. at 171, 527 S.E.2d at 554.
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Defendant's counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial judge
sternly admonished the officer for his comment and instructed the jury
to disregard his statement but denied the motion for mistrial."'
The court of appeals agreed that the comment was improper and
unnecessary but found that the trial judge did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion for mistrial because of the overwhelming evidence
of Martin's guilt, including identification by the victim, by the witnesses
who chased down defendant, and by the officer who apprehended
defendant with the stolen money and gun, and Martin's own confession."'
Similarly, the court of appeals in Benford v.State212 found error in
the trial court's admission of evidence that at the time the murder
defendant was apprehended, one and one-half months after the crime,
he was carrying and discarded a .22 caliber pistol and a can containing
seventy-six hits of crack cocaine.203 Reiterating the rule that evidence
is not automatically admissible simply because it was "incident to an
accused's arrest," the court declared that the State should have been
given the burden of proving the relevance and materiality of the
evidence. 2 4 The court of appeals held that the crack cocaine was
relevant and material because of the role crack cocaine played in the
factual predicate of the murder charge.20 5 The court found, however,
that the evidence of the .22 caliber pistol was not relevant because the
State's evidence established that the murder was committed with a
shotgun obtained from a third party.20 6 Nevertheless, the court found
harmless, "given the overwhelming evidence of Benford's
the error
20 7
guilt."

Accordingly, in Roberson v. State °5 the court of appeals sanctioned
the State for prosecuting a child molestation case.20 9 The court

200. Id.
201. Id. The court of appeals also admonished the officer and stated its position
regarding the increasing frequency of this type of error: "Although we do not condone what
has become a far too frequent practice when a law enforcement officer takes the stand-an
improper reference to a defendant's prior criminal history-we do not find that these
particular circumstances warrant a reversal of Martin's conviction." Id. at 903, 525 S.E.2d
at 731.
202. 272 Ga. 348, 528 S.E.2d 795 (2000).
203. Id. at 350, 528 S.E.2d at 797.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 241 Ga. App. 226, 526 S.E.2d 428 (1999).
209. Id. at 226, 526 S.E.2d at 430.
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nevertheless held that the resulting error was harmless and affirmed the
conviction.2 1° The defense moved for a pretrial evidentiary hearing on
the reliability of the child witness, pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 24-316.211 The State objected to a hearing and, instead, used the trial
arena to present its proof of the reliability of the victim.2 1 2

This

amounted to nothing more than bolstering the credibility of one witness
through the testimony of other witnesses, which is strictly prohibited. 2 3 The State, however, relied upon its burden of proving the child's
Statute.214
credibility and veracity as dictated by the Child Hearsay
215
Over objection the trial court allowed the testimony.
The court of appeals strongly admonished the prosecutor for so
blatantly circumventing the necessity of a pretrial evidentiary hearing
to improperly bolster the victim's credibility before the jury.216 But, in
analyzing the evidence that the State procured from the victim's mother,
the court found that the prosecutor's desired bolstering effect was
undone by the fairly unresponsive nature of the witness' answers,
primarily the fact that her child did lie about the "normal things that
children lie about."2 1 The court of appeals held that the error was
harmless and affirmed the conviction for child molestation.2 8
In contrast, the court of appeals in Booker v. State219 found that
permitting the state to bolster its witness' testimony rose to the level of
Booker's accomplice in a burglary, aggravated
harmful error. 220
assault, and armed robbery had implicated Booker in a statement he
gave to police shortly after the crime. When called by the state to
testify, the accomplice admitted making the. statements but disavowed
the truth of Booker's involvement, testifying that he had been coerced
into implicating Booker.221
In an effort to rehabilitate its witness, the State introduced two other
statements made by the accomplice in which he had named the
perpetrators of five other murders and evidence that, in all the matters
in which the accomplice had named a perpetrator, the State secured
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O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
241 Ga. App. at 226, 526 S.E.2d at 430.
Id., 526 S.E.2d at 431.
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (1995).
241 Ga. App. at 227-28, 526 S.E.2d at 430-31.
Id. at 227, 526 S.E.2d at 430.
Id.
Id. at 230, 526 S.E.2d at 432.
242 Ga. App. 80, 528 S.E.2d 849 (2000).
Id. at 80, 528 S.E.2d at 850.
Id. at 82, 528 S.E.2d at 851.
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guilty pleas by all the named parties except Booker.222 The court of
appeals held that the trial court erred by admitting this evidence
because it was an improper attempt to bolster the credibility of the
witness using otherwise inadmissible facts. 223 Further, the court found
that the evidence of the accomplice's testimony necessarily implicated
Booker in several other criminal matters and showed Booker's association with people who had committed infamous crimes, both of which
made the trial court's error harmful, requiring reversal.224
In Bryan v. State,22 the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the
admissibility of evidence that defendant's husband had increased his
automobile liability insurance three months before defendant was
alleged to have staged a car accident in which she doused the car with
ingnitable liquids and set it on fire, killing her mother, who was a
passenger in the car.226
Relying upon Stoudemire v. State,227 the court held that the trial
court erred in admitting evidence of the insurance policy because the
State failed to prove independent evidence of a nexus between the crime
and the existence of the insurance policy. 228 The court had reaffirmed
Stoudemire two years later in Woodham v. State,229 cautioning prosecutors that they "undertake severe risk of reversal when attempting to
inject evidence of an insurance policy without first establishing the
required nexus."3 ° Because the State in Bryan failed to present
evidence that defendant was aware of the policy change her husband
made, or that defendant would ever benefit in any pecuniary way from
the insurance policy, the trial court erred in denying defendant's pretrial
motion to exclude this evidence, warranting reversal.23 '
C.

Expert Witnesses

In Odom v.State,3 2 the court of appeals gave the appellate bar a
thrashing for "utterly meritless" and "far-fetched" claims in child sexual
abuse cases in which "the expert's testimony invaded the province of the
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Id. at 83, 528 S.E.2d at 852.
Id. at 84, 528 S.E.2d at 852.
271 Ga. 231, 518 S.E.2d 672 (1999).
Id. at 232, 518 S.E.2d at 672.
261 Ga. 49, 401 S.E.2d 482 (1991).
271 Ga. at 232, 518 S.E.2d at 673.
263 Ga. 580, 439 S.E.2d 471 (1993).
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271 Ga. at 233, 518 S.E.2d at 673.
243 Ga. App. 227, 531 S.E.2d 207 (2000).
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jury and improperly bolstered the credibility of the victim." 233 Acknowledging that this allegation of error has seen some reversal
"success," Justice Eldridge chastised the overuse of the claim when the
distinction between proper opinion testimony by the expert-the victim's
examination was consistent with sexual abuse-versus improper
bolstering opinion that invades
the province of the jury-the victim was
23 4
sexually abused-is so clear.
But the criticism was even-handed. Justice Eldridge also chastised
those prosecutors "who will not learn the distinctions" between proper
and improper opinion testimony, thereby eliciting improper expert
testimony by asking open-ended questions and failing to prepare their
expert witnesses. 235 The result, Justice Eldridge warned, will be the
continued raising by the defense bar of meritless and meritorious
appellate allegations,
"thereby putting the child/victim through the
236
trauma of retrial."
In Odom v. State,237 it seemed clear to the court of appeals that the
opinions rendered by most of the various experts in the case were
proper.23" The court did find a meritorious claim as the result of an
open-ended question to the State's psychiatric witness: "Have you been
able to attribute a source to the child's problems?"2 39 The expert
24 °
replied: "[Tihis child, in my opinion, had been sexually abused."
Although the court found the opinion to be improper, it held that the
trial court's sustaining of the defense objection and subsequent
admonition to the jury to disregard the answer sufficiently addressed
defendant's objection. 24 1
Defendant never moved for a mistrial;
therefore, the convictions for aggravated sodomy and aggravated child
molestation were affirmed.242
D.

Bruton Problem

The admission of a statement of a nontestifying codefendant that
inculpates a defendant unconstitutionally deprives that defendant of the
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses, even when the jury
is instructed to limit its consideration of the statement to the codefen-
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dant who made it. 243 Therefore, the trial court must scrutinize any

attempted redaction by the State to determine whether the redacted
version of the statement is still capable of being interpreted as implicating the defendant. If so, it is not admissible.
The trial court in Collins v. State2 4 had trouble with this rule.
When the State tendered a redacted statement by the nontestifying
codefendant in which the name of defendant was redacted and, in its
place, the words "anyone else," "anybody," "somebody," "this individual,"
"this other individual," and "the man" were substituted, the trial court
ruled it admissible.2 45 To further compound the error, the court gave
the following "curative instruction" to the jury:
There's a Constitutional rule, I mean, you know, I'm just going to tell
the jury what the law is. The Supreme Court of the United States in
1984, decided that when one defendant made a statement that implicates another defendant, even though-in other words, if Victor Lyles'
statement says something bad about Bruce Collins, ya'll are not
supposed to hear it under the theory of the Supreme Court of the United
States that it violates the defendant's right to confront any witnesses
against them which would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment, I

believe. Is that correct?
what Lyles said
Now officer, can you go through that statement and say
2 46
about himself and not make any reference to Collins?

Holding that the statement, as redacted, did not protect defendant
against the Bruton problem, the court of appeals reversed defendant's
conviction for burglary because the court's admonition to the jury all but
instructed them that the redacted name was, in fact, that of defendant.247
The trial court in Hill v. State24 made the same mistake by admitting into evidence the statement made by a nontestifying codefendant by
simply changing defendant's name to "someone."249 The Georgia
Supreme Court held that this error was harmful, warranting reversal of
Hill's conviction for murder, because the State went a step further by
eliciting testimony from the arresting officer that it was the codefendant's statement that led them to arrest Hill.250 "Thus, any doubt the
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jury may have had that Hill was the 'someone' whom Davis maintained
by testimony the state deliberatecommitted the murder was eradicated
251
ly elicited from its own witness."

E. Elements of the Crime
Last year's debate over the requirement of force in cases of sexual
offenses against children was still brewing this reporting period. In
Durham v. State252 and Patterson v. State,253 the court of appeals
concluded that the State must prove the element of force in rape cases
and aggravated sodomy cases rather than presuming force as a matter
of law based on the victim's age.254
The new crop of internet crime cases precipitated a constitutional
challenge to the essential elements of the crimes of attempted child
molestation and attempted statutory rape. The Houston County Vice
Squad began a crack down of internet pornography sites at which adult
males place messages seeking minors for explicit sex acts. The agents
respond to these inquiries, posing as young girls, engage in computer
dialogue with the suspect, and agree to meeting the suspect at the
designated time and place for the purpose of engaging in various sexual
acts. The meeting place is ordinarily the Houston County Mall. When
the suspect shows up for the meeting, he is arrested and charged with
attempting to commit the sexual acts for which he had previously
described as the purpose for the meeting.
One of these subjects was Samuel Dennard. In Dennard v. State,255
the sting took place like all the others. Dennard posted a message on an
Internet site that said he was seeking girls between the ages of fifteen
and eighteen who were interested in asphyxiation, strangulation,
smothering, drowning, and hanging. Sergeant Darin Meadows replied
to this message, pretending to be a fifteen-year-old girl named "Shari."
Dennard and Shari communicated via the Internet, at which time

251. Id.
252. 241 Ga. App. 24, 525 S.E.2d 757 (1999).
253. 242 Ga. App. 885, 531 S.E.2d 759 (2000).
254. 241 Ga. App. at 25, 525 S.E.2d at 758; 242 Ga. App. at 885, 531 S.E.2d at 761.
Durham's conviction for rape was reversed because the trial judge, over objection,
erroneously instructed the jury that sex acts directed to children less than sixteen years
old were forcible as a matter of law. 241 Ga. App. at 25, 525 S.E.2d at 758. Patterson's
conviction for aggravated sodomy was affirmed by the court of appeals, which held that
there was "more than sufficient" evidence of force to justify a jury instruction on
aggravated sodomy rather than simple sodomy. 242 Ga. App. at 886, 531 S.E.2d at 761.
255. 243 Ga. App. 868, 534 S.E.2d 182 (2000).
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Dennard indicated that he sought a sexual relationship involving
asphyxiation.2 56
Dennard and Shari discussed meeting at a nearby mall. During their
Internet conversations Dennard expressed that he wanted to smother
Shari with a chloroform-soaked pillow and have sex with her after she
passed out. Dennard arranged to meet Shari at the mall on November
25. He indicated that he wished to take Shari to his house and make a
videotape of him smothering her and then having sex with her while she
lay unconscious. Dennard stated that he would be holding a Sprite and
a flower when they would meet at the mall. He also sent Shari an
e-mail confirming their arrangement and describing the clothes he would
be wearing. Sgt. Meadows and other officers found Dennard at the mall
holding a Sprite and a rose in his hand, and they arrested him there.
Sgt. Meadows obtained a search warrant for Dennard's home, and upon
searching the home he found a considerable amount of child pornography
and a photograph of "Shari" that Sgt. Meadows had mailed to him over
the Internet.257
Dennard was charged with attempted child molestation, attempted
statutory rape, attempting to entice a child for indecent purposes, and
attempted child exploitation. Dennard filed a general and special
demurrer to the indictment. The trial court overruled both demurrers,
and the appellate court granted interlocutory appeal of the trial court's
order.258
Dennard's general demurrers were predicated upon one argument:
Because the crime of child molestation must be committed in the
presence of the child, the act of Internet communication cannot, as a
matter of law, form the basis for this crime. 9 Relying upon Vines v.
State,26 ° which held in 1998 that the act of child molestation could not
be committed over the telephone,261 Dennard argued that the telephone prohibition should be applied to Internet communications, which
are not factually distinguishable from sexual contact over the telephone.26 2
The court agreed that the crime of child molestation could not have
been completed exclusively through Internet contact; however, the court
found that the crime of attempted child molestation, as well as
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attempted statutory rape, requires proof only of a substantial step
toward the crime.263 That substantial step does not need to be committed in the presence of the child and, from the facts alleged in the
indictment, a fact finder would be authorized to conclude that the
predicate acts alleged could constitute a substantial step toward2 6the
4
commission of the attempt crimes for which Dennard was charged.
The appellate court did, however, conclude that the trial court erred
in overruling the special demurrers to the indictment on the ground that
the indictment failed to set forth the name of the victim.26 5 The court
noted that crimes against society in general, such as drug offenses or
prostitution, do not require the inclusion of the victim's name on the
charging document.266 However, a crime against an individual does
require the prosecution to allege the aggrieved party.267 This holding
poses an interesting question: If the fifteen-year-old Shari did not exist,
is the undercover agent the victim?
VI.

A.

DEFENSE CASE

Defendant's Testimony

Can a defendant be questioned regarding the veracity of other
testifying witnesses? In Green v. State,268 the court of appeals changed
its previous position because recent Georgia Supreme Court cases have
rejected the long-standing prohibition against such a line of questioning. 269 According to Cargill v. State,270 decided in 1986, the rule in
Georgia was that asking one witness about the veracity of another
witness was impermissible. 271 The supreme court in Cargill held that
"it is improper for counsel to ask a witness whether another witness is
lying. It is generally the function of witnesses to testify as to their
personal knowledge of relevant facts; it is not the function of witnesses
to determine the veracity of other witnesses."27 2 But, in 1990 and
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again in 1998, two Georgia Supreme Court opinions effectively abandoned that holding, without expressly overruling Cargill. 3
Relying upon the holdings expressed in those 1990 and 1998 cases, the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmatively did what the supreme court had
impliedly done for almost the past ten years: It rejected the Cargill
opinion, allowing the State to cross-examine a testifying defendant
regarding his opinion of the veracity of the testimony provided by the
State's witnesses.274 With all the other prohibitions against using a
witness to bolster or comment upon the veracity of another witness and
the legal principle that the jury will be the one to determine witness
credibility, we are hard pressed to follow the logic in forcing the
defendant, at his peril, to explain why his testimony differs from that of
the State's witnesses.
B.

Expert Witnesses

A significant holding for all criminal practitioners comes with the
Georgia Supreme Court decision of Johnson v. State.2 5 The court held
that the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the reliability of
eyewitness evidence was left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.276 In doing so the court 277overruled long-standing precedent
prohibiting such expert testimony.
Keith Johnson was tried and convicted of the crimes of armed robbery,
aggravated battery, and aggravated assault in an attack at an ATM
upon a sixty-two-year-old woman, who was attacked from behind by a
black male who cut her throat, knocked her to the ground, stabbed her

273. Dorsey v. State, 259 Ga. 809, 809, 387 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1990). Affirming a
conviction for murder, the Georgia Supreme Court wrote,
Dorsey next contends that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to ask
Dorsey during cross examination, "So, everybody's lying about this whole thing but
you, is that right?" He contends that the question improperly calls for the
defendant to make credibility determinations about the testimony of other
witnesses. We do not agree. The state may challenge the defendant's truthfulness
on cross-examination. While the form of the question was somewhat argumentative, we cannot conclude that the court erred in allowing it.
Id. at 809, 387 S.E.2d at 890. Eight years later, in Whatley v. State, the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld another death penalty conviction in which the defendant was asked to
comment on the veracity of the state's witnesses. 270 Ga. 296, 301, 509 S.E.2d 49, 51-52
(1998). The appellant cited Cargill,but the court held that the State's cross-examination
was not reversible error, especially in light of the fact that the defense attorney never
objected to this line of questioning. Id. at 301, 509 S.E.2d at 51.
274. 242 Ga. App. at 871-72, 532 S.E.2d at 115.
275. 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549 (2000).
276. Id. at 254, 526 S.E.2d at 551.
277. Jones v. State, 232 Ga. 762, 766, 208 S.E.2d 850, 854 (1974).
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repeatedly, and then fled. The attack was captured on the bank video
camera. The victim chose Johnson's photo out of a photo lineup five
months after the crime. Within a month of the crime, she had been
shown several photo lineups that did not contain Johnson's photo and
278
declined to identify any of the photographs as that of her attacker.
Additionally, a witness who had been parked near the ATM before the
attack stated that her attention had been drawn to a black man who was
standing near the ATM and who "kind of jumped" behind some bushes
when he noticed that the witness was watching him. 9 She assisted
a police artist in preparing a composite picture of the man, and she gave
very specific descriptions of his eyebrows and one of his ears. The
witness also declined to choose from photographic lineups that did not
contain a photograph of Johnson but did select Johnson's photo the first
time it was presented to her in a lineup. 80
The defense sought to introduce testimony by an expert in the field of
eyewitness identification.28 ' Relying upon Norris v. State, s2 the trial
court and court of appeals in Johnson v. State2"3 held that the evidence
is inadmissible as a matter of law because a witness may not disparage
the memory of another witness to impeach testimony.2 4 The Georgia
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court
should retain discretion to admit proffered expert testimony regarding
the reliability of eyewitness identifications. 2" The court noted that,
despite Norris, it has "strongly approved the trial court's exercise of its
discretion in regard to determining the admissibility of this type of
expert testimony ...

and has explicitly applied an abuse of discretion

standard when reviewing the trial court's ruling."28 6 Accordingly, the
court held that such expert evidence is admissible when the State has
no other corroborating evidence and the problems with the eyewitness
identifications cannot be shown through cross-examination alone.28 7
Another interesting avenue of expert testimony was paved in Porter
v.State.2" A four-year-old boy spent one month of summer visitation
with his mother, Andrea Porter, and her husband, Thomas. During the
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boy's visit, Thomas committed numerous acts of physical and sexual
abuse against the child. Thomas admitted his crime and was convicted.
His wife also was indicted for cruelty to children and child endangerment, and she appealed that conviction.289
Before trial the State moved to exclude defendant Andrea Porter's
expert witness, a clinical psychologist who had conducted an examination of defendant. 2" The doctor was prepared to testify that Andrea
Porter's "whole psychological makeup is almost designed to not see
things that are too painful to see."291 Because Andrea Porter's entire
defense was that she had no knowledge of the physical abuse her
husband inflicted upon her son, she wanted to show that although a
reasonable person would have seen the signs, her psychological condition
caused her to block out the signs of abuse. The State objected to the
admissibility of the evidence with a two-fold argument. First, the
evidence was inadmissible because it was in the nature of evidence of
diminished capacity, yet the defense had failed to provide notice to the
State, pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1, that defendant
would invoke an insanity defense. The defense responded by arguing
that the evidence did not go to the issue of diminished capacity but,
instead, to impaired perception.292 "His argument was that such
evidence was admissible, just as evidence of a vision impairment or other
sensory difficulty would be admissible, not as evidence of diminished
mental capacity but as evidence of impaired perception."29 3 Second,
the State argued that the evidence invaded the province of the jury by
addressing the ultimate issue in the case. The trial court granted the
motion to exclude the testimony. The defense responded by arguing that
the evidence was essential to the sole
defense of lack of knowledge. The
294
trial court excluded the testimomy.
On appeal the court of appeals reversed the conviction, finding that
the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this psychological
testimony. 295 It affirmed the trial court's ruling on the State's motion
for reconsideration. 2" First, the court found that the defense did not
have to file a notice pertaining to insanity, agreeing with defendant that
the issue does not relate to insanity but, instead, to the issue of whether
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defendant knew that her husband was abusing her son.2 97 Second, the
court agreed with the defense that the testimony supported its sole
defense and that the defense did not invade the province of the jury
because, although the testimony bore upon the ultimate issue in the
case, it is clear that the jury would have no way of reaching a conclusion
on this issue without the testimony of the expert.298
VII.
A.

SENTENCING

Violent Felonies

Fleming v. State299 definitively answered the question of whether the
March 1998 amendment to O.C.G.A. section 17-10-6.1(b), ordering that
anyone convicted of one of the enumerated serious violent felonies may
not be afforded first offender treatment, would be applied retroactively.3 °0 The Georgia Supreme Court held that it would not.3"'
The court determined that "a crime is to be construed and punished
according to the provisions of the law existing at the time of its
commission."" 2 Applying this holding and rationale, the court of
appeals vacated the sentences of two appellants who had been convicted
of armed robbery. In Riley v. State, 3 ' defendant pleaded guilty to
armed robbery. The trial court sentenced him to fifteen years of which
he was to serve eight. The Department of Corrections refused to take
custody of Riley, declaring that the sentence was illegal because it did
not comport with the minimum mandatory ten years to serve, as
dictated by O.C.G.A. section 17-10-6.1(b). The trial court then ordered
Riley to serve ten years of the fifteen-year sentence.0 a
Riley appealed the consitutionality of his sentence, asserting an ex
post facto argument. By this time, however, the Fleming decision had
already addressed this issue, so the case was remanded to the court of
appeals to rule in accordance with Fleming."°' Because the crime
committed by Riley occured in January of 1998 and the amendment to
the statute was effective in March 1998, the sentence was reversed, and
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was ordered to resentence Riley in accordance with
the trial3 court
6
1
Fleming.
B.

Recidivist Punishment

The Georgia Supreme Court was asked to reconsider its position
regarding the question of who has the burden of production in proving
that a prior felony conviction was valid in order for it to form the basis
for recidivist punishment." 7 Until July 1999 the rule, pursuant to
Pope v. State,... was that the State bore the burden of proving to the
trial court that every prior felony conviction upon which the State relied
in seeking recidivist punishment was legally obtained. 0 9 A legally
obtained conviction required the State to prove the defendant had been
properly advised of his rights.3 10
In 1992, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Parke v.
The Court held that if a defendant raises the issue of
Raley.3 1
involuntary waiver in opposing recidivist treatment, he should bear the
burden of production to support his claim.31 2' The Court reasoned that
3
colloafter almost twenty-five years of using Boykin v. Alabama
quies, there is no reason to presume from the mere unavailability of a
transcript that the defendant was not advised of his rights.3 14
This logic was invoked by the Georgia Supreme Court in Nash v.
In Nash the court overruled Pope to hold that the burden of
State.1
production is placed upon the recidivism defendant to challenge the
validity of a prior guilty plea to enhance a sentence.316 The court
established a three-part test to be applied. 317 First, the burden is on
the State to prove the existence of a prior guilty plea that was assisted
by counsel.31 8 Second, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce

306. Id. Similarly, in Horton v. State, 241 Ga. App. 605, 527 S.E.2d 254 (1999), the
court of appeals remanded Horton's sentence for armed robbery to the trial court to be
given first offender consideration in accordance with Fleming. Id. at 606, 527 S.E.2d at
256.
307. A felony conviction is valid if it was made pursuant to a voluntary waiver of
rights.
308. 256 Ga. 195, 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986).
309. Id. at 209, 345 S.E.2d at 844.
310. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
311. 506 U.S. 20 (1992).
312. Id. at 24.
313. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
314. 506 U.S. at 30.
315. 271 Ga. 281, 519 S.E.2d 893 (1999).
316. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 894.
317. Id. at 284, 519 S.E.2d at 896.
318. Id. at 285, 519 S.E.2d at 896.
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evidence showing that the plea was invalid because it was uninformed.3 19 Third, if the defendant satisfies his burden, the State must
show that the plea was constitutionally
sound, either by the transcript
3 20
evidence.
extrinsic
any
or
In Nash defendant was convicted of aggravated assault. At his
sentencing, the State introduced a certified copy of a prior guilty plea to
a felony. Defendant asserted that he had not been properly advised
prior to his plea, pursuant to the decision in Boykin. The State conceded
that there was no transcript of the plea hearing but presented evidence
by the prosecutor who was present at the plea hearing that the proper
plea colloquy always accompanied guilty pleas in that court. Defendant
was sentenced as a recidivist, and his sentence was affirmed by the court
of appeals.3 2' The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to
22
consider its holding in Pope regarding the burden of production.
The supreme court remanded the case and ordered that Nash 23be
resentenced according to the three-part method that it established.
To invoke the provisions of recidivist punishment, the State must be
able to offer proof that the defendant has been convicted of at least one
prior felony. In Brantley v. State, 24 the State invoked O.C.G.A. section
17-10-7(c), 5 arguing that Brantley had three prior felony convictions.
It relied, however, upon one first offender conviction that, as a matter
of law, cannot form the basis for recidivist treatment. 26 The State
argued that the first offender status had been revoked "by operation of
law" because defendant had committed two more felonies while under
his first offender probation. 27
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that there is 3no
28
such thing as revocation of first offender status by operation of law.
The State must initiate revocation proceedings, which they did not do;
therefore, Brantley had only two prior felony convictions and needed to
be resentenced according to O.C.G.A. section 17-10-7(a). 29

319.
320.
321.
322.

Id.
Id.
Id., 519 S.E.2d at 897.
Id. at 281, 519 S.E.2d at 894.

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at 286, 519 S.E.2d at 897.
242 Ga. App. 85, 528 S.E.2d 264 (2000).
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c) (1997).
242 Ga. App. at 87-88, 528 S.E.2d at 266-67.
Id. at 87, 528 S.E.2d at 267.
Id.
Id.
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C.

Sex Offender
The Sex Offender Registry promulgated by O.C.G.A. section 42-1-12
orders certain conditions of probation and makes available to the public
certain information regarding defendants who are accused of crimes
involving sexual acts. 3 ' In Sequeira v. State,33 ' defendant pleaded
guilty to two counts of simple battery for having placed his hands on the
breasts and between the legs of a fifteen-year-old girl. As a condition of
probation, Sequeira was ordered to register as a sex offender. The trial
court based this condition upon the language of the statute that directs
registration in the event of any conviction resulting from an underlying
sexual offense against a victim who is a minor.33 2 The court of appeals
reversed the order directing his registration, holding that the phrase
"underlying sexual offense" must be given its literal construction to
require that the underlying offense be one that is delineated under the
"sexual offenses" portion of the Georgia Code.333 Because the crime of
simple battery, regardless of the underlying sexual facts, is not one of
those enumerated crimes, the trial court was not authorized to require
Sequeira to register as a sex offender.334
D. Merger
In Taylor v. State,3 5 defendant was convicted of violating the DUI
statute336 by driving (1) under the influence of alcohol, (2) under the
influence of drugs, and (3) under the combined influence of alcohol and
drugs. The judge sentenced defendant to four consecutive twelve-month
jail sentences on the DUI counts.3 ' The court of appeals held that the
three counts of DUI are merely three different modes of committing the
single offense of DUI.338 The trial court thus erred in subjecting him
to multiple punishments for one offense.339

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12 (1997).
243 Ga. App. 718, 534 S.E.2d 166 (2000).
Id. at 718, 534 S.E.2d at 166.
Id. at 719, 534 S.E.2d at 167.
Id.
238 Ga. App. 753, 520 S.E.2d 267 (1999).
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391 (1997).
238 Ga. App. at 753, 520 S.E.2d at 268.
Id. at 755, 520 S.E.2d at 269.

339. Id. (citing Hogan v. State, 178 Ga. App. 534, 343 S.E.2d 770 (1986)).
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ProbationRevocation
When probation is revoked for anything other than a new felony
conviction, the Georgia Code dictates that the probation may be revoked
for no more than two years.340 If, however, the defendant violated his
probation by "the violation of a special condition imposed pursuant to
this Code section," the court may revoke the balance of his probation.341 It is the phrase, "the violation of a special condition imposed
pursuant to this Code section," that has resulted in opinions scattered
all over the board by the appellate courts. Does any condition imposed
by the court, outside of those general conditions placed upon all
probationers, qualify as a "special condition imposed pursuant to this
Code section"? If not, what distinguishes one special condition from
another?
This issue was addressed in Glover v. State.342 Defendant had been
convicted in 1989 for child molestation. He was given a thirty-year
sentence and ordered to serve seven years in prison and the remainder
on probation. The trial court also ordered him to abide by an additional
seven conditions while on probation that included restrictions on contact
with children and required participation in counseling. One year after
being released from prison, Glover was arrested for violating three of the
seven special conditions. After a probation revocation hearing, the trial
court found that defendant had violated his probation by contact with
children and failure to participate in counseling. The trial court revoked
ten years of his probation. Glover appealed, arguing that O.C.G.A.
section 42-8-34.1 only authorizes the revocation of two years of his
probation for having violated his probation but not having committed a
new felony offense. He argued that the conditions he violated were not
special conditions "pursuant to this Code section."343
The court of appeals analyzed the four cases that had construed that
clause.344 The court concluded that the clause, as it held in Gearinger
v. Lee34 and Manville v. Hampton,3 4 6 was meaningless.347 This
conclusion means that any violation of a special condition imposed upon
a probationer can result in the full revocation of his probation. In so

340.
341.
342.
343.

O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34.1 (1997).
Id.
239 Ga. App. 155, 521 S.E.2d 84 (1999).
Id. at 155-56, 521 S.E.2d at 85.

344. Id.
345. 266 Ga. 167, 465 S.E.2d 440 (1996).
346. 266 Ga. 857, 471 S.E.2d 872 (1996).
347. 239 Ga. App. at 158, 521 S.E.2d at 86.

20001

CRIMINAL LAW

207

ruling the court overruled Lawrence v. State48 and Dunlap v.
State,349 two cases in which the court had previously given some
350
meaning to the phrase, "imposed pursuant to this Code section."
VIII.
A.

APPELLATE REVIEW

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

It took habeas corpus proceedings for two appellants to get a ruling
that they had been deprived of effective representation. In Sloan v.
Sanders,35 ' defendant's trial attorney filed a demand for trial, but
when the case was not tried within the statutory time frame, the trial
attorney failed to move for dismissal. Defendant was later convicted.
His appellate attorney also failed to raise the error on appeal.352 The
court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 33 In a habeas proceeding, the
issue was raised and argued. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the
issue of trial counsel's effectiveness had been waived by failure to raise
the issue on appeal. 5 4 However, the failure to raise the obvious issue
rendered appellant counsel's representation ineffective, and the lower
court's denial of the habeas petition was reversed.5
In Turpin v. Bennett,356 defendant's expert witness had taken the
stand on defendant's behalf, testifying on the issue of defendant's
insanity. 57 Instead of testifying to the opinion he had previously
rendered,
the witness abandoned his former diagnosis without explanation,
appeared "deathly ill," made "cartoonish" facial expressions, volunteered testimony that whoever committed the murder was a "vicious
maniac," and stated that appropriate psychiatric treatment for Bennett
would have been nothing more than Tylenol for his headache, Zantac
for his stomach ailment, and follow-up care. The jury laughed out loud
at his testimony.35

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

228 Ga. App. 745, 492 S.E.2d 727 (1997).
231 Ga. App. 82, 497 S.E.2d 640 (1998).
239 Ga. App. at 160, 521 S.E.2d at 88.
271 Ga. 299, 519 S.E.2d 219 (1999).
Id. at 299, 519 S.E.2d at 220.
214 Ga. App. 784, 786, 449 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1994).
271 Ga. at 300, 519 S.E.2d at 220.
Id., 519 S.E.2d at 220-21.
272 Ga. 57, 525 S.E.2d 354 (2000).
Id. at 58, 525 S.E.2d at 355.
Id., 525 S.E.2d at 355-56.
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It was determined that the witness' behavior was due to his own
impaired mental condition. 59
The trial lawyer failed to move for a continuance in order to locate
another expert witness or take some other remedial measure. Defendant
was convicted.36 ° The supreme court affirmed.3"' He filed a habeas
petition, which was granted at the trial level based upon defendant's
expert having rendered ineffective assistance.362 The Georgia Supreme
Court reversed the granting of the habeas petition, holding that there is
no constitutional right to the effective assistance of an expert witness.
The petition was remanded to consider the remaining claims.363 The
trial court again granted the petition, this time resting its decision upon
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel for having failed to move for a
continuance. 3" The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.3 65
Failure to Preserve Issue for Appellate Review
The long-standing and erratically imposed reliance by the Georgia
Court of Appeals upon O.C.G.A. section 5-6-40, which requires that each
enumeration of error be set out separately to prevent the risk of
waiver,36636 was finally clarified.
In Felix v. State, 67 defendant,
argued
a suppression motion at the
possession
of
cocaine,
charged with
trial level. The motion was overruled and defendant was convicted. On
appeal defendant raised the trial court's denial of his suppression motion
as an allegation of error. Defendant made four arguments in support of
his contention. 36 Citing O.C.G.A. section 5-6-40, the court of appeals
addressed only one of the four grounds supporting this allegation of
error, ruling that the other grounds were waived because they were not
separately alleged in the enumeration of errors.369
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider this
practice. 37"
The supreme court attacked the "multifarious" and
"disparate" approach to employing O.C.G.A. section 5-6-40 to render a

B.

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
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Id., 525 S.E.2d at 355.
Id. at 57, 525 S.E.2d at 355.
262 Ga. 149, 154, 414 S.E.2d 218, 224 (1992).
270 Ga. 584, 587, 513 S.E.2d 478, 481 (1999).
Id. at 590, 513 S.E.2d at 483.
272 Ga. at 58, 525 S.E.2d at 355.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-40 (1995).
271 Ga. 534, 523 S.E.2d 1 (1999).
Id. at 534, 523 S.E.2d at 2.
Id.

370. Id.
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waiver."' The court clarified the difference between an enumeration
of error, which is a challenge to an error of law, and an argument in
support of a legal position, which is an appellant's contention of why the
court erred.372 The former is the only allegation that must be laid out
separately as an enumeration. The latter may consist of a number of
arguments in support of the enumeration of error. 3
In Felix the enumeration of error was properly presented as a
challenge to the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress.37 4 The
arguments, likewise, were the "individual facets of appellants' attack on
375
the legal ruling ...and are not, in and of themselves, errors of law."
The case was remanded to the court of appeals to address the appellant's
remaining arguments in support of his claim that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress.37
C. Presence of the Defendant
Two malice murder convictions, from two different counties, were
reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court on September 13, 1999. In both
cases the error was the same-the defendant was not present at a
proceeding at which he had a right to be and had not waived his
constitutional right to be there. In Pennie v. State, 7 the Cobb County
trial court was notified by a juror that a spectator in the courtroom had
attempted to speak with him. The juror was brought into chambers,
along with the prosecutor and defense attorney, but defendant was
absent. The juror was' questioned, and both counsel agreed to allow the
juror to remain in deliberations. At the conclusion of the in-chambers
questioning, defense counsel announced that he waived his client's
presence at that conference.378
However, the waiver right does not belong to the attorney; it belongs
only to the defendant. Defendant did not waive his presence; therefore,
the trial court violated article I, section 1, part 12 of the Georgia
Constitution, 7" which imparts to every criminal defendant the "right
to be present and see and hear, all the proceedings which are had

371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id.
Id. at 539, 523 S.E.2d at 6.
Id. at 535, 523 S.E.2d at 3.
Id.
Id. at 539, 523 S.E.2d at 6.
Id. at 540, 523 S.E.2d at 6.
271 Ga. 419, 520 S.E.2d 448 (1999).
Id. at 420-21, 520 S.E.2d at 450.
Id. at 422, 520 S.E.2d at 451.
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against him on the trial before the Court."38 ° A colloquy between the
trial judge and jury is one such proceeding.
In Brooks v. State,"' the DeKalb County Superior Court held two inchambers conferences at which the judge, the prosecutor, and Brooks'
defense counsel struck prospective jurors for cause, discussed and
resolved defense counsel's Batson challenge, and conducted a portion of
the jury strikes. Defendant had not waived his presence." 2 Again, a
conviction for malice murder was reversed.8 3
D. Abuse of Discretion
In Kier v. State,"4 the court of appeals held that the Lowndes
County Superior Court abused its discretion by denying an indigent
defendant's request for a trial transcript of his mistrial in preparation
for his retrial.3" 5 Two factors "are relevant to evaluating an indigent
defendant's claim to a free transcript: (1) the transcript's value in
connection with the defendant's trial or appeal; and (2) the accessibility
38 6
of other means that would fulfill the same functions as a transcript."
Noting that a transcript of the first trial would allow the defense to
impeach the State's witnesses at the retrial and that the first trial ended
in a hung jury based upon the jury's apparent reluctance to accept the
testimony of one or more State witnesses, the court should have provided
the transcript to defendant free of charge.38 7
IX.

MANDAMUS

The creative lawyering award goes to those attorneys who represented
the defendant in Dean v. Gober,388 who got caught in a reverse sting
when he bought methamphetamine from an undercover cop. Gober, the
defendant, filed a mandamus petition to require the chief of police to
destroy all the drugs the police had seized and were storing for use in
reverse stings. Gober cited the forfeiture statute, which required
destruction of schedule I drugs and controlled substances when the
owner was unknown. The chief possessed a safe full of such drugs,
which he was required to destroy. Unfortunately for Gober, however, the

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797, 807, 505 S.E.2d 731, 740 (1998).
271 Ga. 456, 519 S.E.2d 907 (1999).
Id. at 456, 519 S.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 457, 519 S.E.2d at 909.
240 Ga. App. 152, 525 S.E.2d 102 (1999).
Id. at 154, 525 S.E.2d at 103.
Id. at 153, 525 S.E.2d at 103 (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971)).
Id.
272 Ga. 20, 524 S.E.2d 722 (1999).
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statute exempts from the flames those drugs held as evidence in a
pending case.3" 9 And Gober's mandamus did not end all reverse stings,
only those involving schedule I drugs and drugs whose owners the police
no longer know.39 °
X.

CONCLUSION

This reporting period saw some important new law, especially in the
field of demurrers, the admissibility of audio-taped telephone conversations, the discovery statute, expert witnesses, and sentencing of
recidivists and violent felons. Our thanks to those practitioners who
have continued to challenge the law and who have remained creative
and vigilant in their representation of accused citizens.

389.
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Id. at 20, 23, 524 S.E.2d at 723, 725.
Id. at 23, 524 S.E.2d at 725.
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